Dear all,
Model UN season is now over. Please keep up with your assignments, and expect the coming weeks prior to Spring Break to move rapidly. If you need ANY help, please contact me.
Best,
JMN
Showing posts with label Ethics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ethics. Show all posts
Sunday, February 07, 2010
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Notes on Utilitarianism
Hi, all. Many of you will be out for the next couple of days, so I am posting my entire set of notes on Utilitarianism for you. Please see me if you have any questions and especially if you get lost or confused.
Utilitarianism:
The value of consequences determines moral rightness. But consequences for whom? Maximize goodness for all people.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value: the possession of properties intrinsic to a thing or properties by virtue of a thing’s relation to other things. A thing’s value is based on either its intrinsic or extrinsic properties. Pleasure has intrinsic value. Epicureanism (hedonism) says yes. Pleasure is the highest good of happiness. But what of virtue (Stoics) a good will (Kant) or knowledge (Ross)?
“Ideal” Utilitarianism recognizes a plurality of things that are intrinsically good, such as virtue and knowledge.
Problems for Utilitarianism:
1) How can we predict the actual as opposed to intended consequences of our actions for all people who might be affected by them and for all acts available to us in a given situation, since the actual consequences are what determines rightness?
2) What about cases where the consequences seem irrelevant, such as truth telling and keeping promises? Truth telling and promise keeping are distinct from their consequences. If they are morally relevant, then utilitarianism has not taken morally relevant factors into consideration.
3) What about rights and justice? What happens when fundamental rights conflict with duty? If there are human rights, then having them doesn’t depend on the consequences of honoring them. Otherwise, not doing so can be justified if a greater good would come about by violating some or all of those rights in a given situation. Also, sometimes the greater good results from acting unjustly or unfairly. Is utilitarianism committed to saying that injustice would be worth it?
Mill tried to handle problem one, which shows how to solve two as well. To stop and calculate the problem of every task would be impossible. We need not do this for all people in general, nor only those involved. Rather, it is enough to apply rules which have come about form experience as what act should be chosen for the greater consequences.
Rules of morality are generalizable, but also improvable (“subordinate principles”, or secondary rules, are enough; we need not always appeal to the principle of utility, and our subordinate principles can and should be revised wherever possible).
The sub. prin. of keeping promises has proven over time to contribute to the overall maximization of happiness than breaking promises, thus we ought to keep promises, even if in a particular case the consequence will not work out beneficially. The general rule will bring about the greatest good for the greatest number on the whole over time.
All things being equal, however, no decision could be made as to which is better, breaking or keeping a promise. The strict deontologist considers all consequences irrelevant; the moderate deontologist argues that it becomes difficult to determine how much value certain consequences have. In all, though, what is the justification of holding to subordinate principles in a given situation if the consequences of such an action will be worse than not holding to the principle? This solution only makes sense if the consequences of such a decision are not known.
Act and Rule Utilitarianism (AU and RU): The use of rules is a concession to these objections, without giving up util. RU states that even if the consequences are greater in a particular situation, following the rule will have the greatest utility yield in the long run.
AU: An act is right if and only if it produces the most good
RU: An act is right if it accords with a rule that generally produces greater good consequences.
Actual Rule Utilitarianism (ARU) and Ideal Rule Utilitarianism(IRU)
Are the rules actual or ideal? The actual rules of society, or the ideal rules that would be greater if followed? Mill, Moore, and S. Toulmin—Actual Rules.
ARU and IRU can produce conflicting results, but both tend to appear less than consequentialist. With ARU, it is no longer the consequence of a particular situation that matter, but the consequences following the general rule.
Why sacrifice the good in particular situations? And how else would a rule improve if we did not take into consideration the consequences of particular situations. (Whether we known the result before hand is crucial. If we do, then the argument stands; if we do not, then we have an answer to the question.) ARU has the danger of defining what is right by virtue of the rule and not the consequence.
IRU has the same problem even more. Acting on Ideal rules means ignoring consequences for the sake of the rule, which is no longer consequentialist.
Richard Brandt argues that to adopt IRU and maintain its consequentialism is to act on AU. There is then no difference between the two.
AU, like egoism (EE), faces the challenge of the claims of competing groups. If AU is for all people then, AU creates an impossible conflict to resolve. IRU does not have this problem, since all people would in the long run be better off by following the ideal rule.
G.E. Moore’s Criticism:
In order to know if an act is right, we need to know all the consequences of an act, and every other possible (relevant) acts. It is obvious that many seemingly inconsequential things may change the world in many ways. If this is true we can never know what all the consequences are in an indefinite series of events that could affect thousands of people. Therefore, we cannot know the right or wrong of a particular act.
Mediated and Unmediated consequences: Should we count mediated consequences when making moral assessment? What if your contribution was virtually meaningless and unknowing? E.x., simply giving someone directions, is it relevant if they are going to rob a bank?
“Ripple in the Pond” postulate: that our effect on consequences gradually reduces to zero. There seems no non-self-serving reason to accept this.
What counts as a consequence? Throwing a stone through a window and the hidden Jew example: The two consequences are different, but how? In the latter, other actors are involved that can affect the outcome. How could you know all the outcomes? And whose act is the act a consequence of?
An obvious problem is that mediated consequences, if relevant, leave open the possibility that we become responsible for things outside of our control. For example, gay couple holding hands leads to their being attacked. Are they responsible? Absurd to thing it the couple’s fault. It makes a cause out of something that is not. Do we really bare the responsibility of someone else’s moral failure for such simple facts?
Counting mediated consequences makes it so that any one can make any of our actions bad simply by acting consequently badly on account of them. Which consequences become relevant for moral consideration is an important moral choice. How, and on what basis can it be decided?
Utilitarianism:
The value of consequences determines moral rightness. But consequences for whom? Maximize goodness for all people.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value: the possession of properties intrinsic to a thing or properties by virtue of a thing’s relation to other things. A thing’s value is based on either its intrinsic or extrinsic properties. Pleasure has intrinsic value. Epicureanism (hedonism) says yes. Pleasure is the highest good of happiness. But what of virtue (Stoics) a good will (Kant) or knowledge (Ross)?
“Ideal” Utilitarianism recognizes a plurality of things that are intrinsically good, such as virtue and knowledge.
Problems for Utilitarianism:
1) How can we predict the actual as opposed to intended consequences of our actions for all people who might be affected by them and for all acts available to us in a given situation, since the actual consequences are what determines rightness?
2) What about cases where the consequences seem irrelevant, such as truth telling and keeping promises? Truth telling and promise keeping are distinct from their consequences. If they are morally relevant, then utilitarianism has not taken morally relevant factors into consideration.
3) What about rights and justice? What happens when fundamental rights conflict with duty? If there are human rights, then having them doesn’t depend on the consequences of honoring them. Otherwise, not doing so can be justified if a greater good would come about by violating some or all of those rights in a given situation. Also, sometimes the greater good results from acting unjustly or unfairly. Is utilitarianism committed to saying that injustice would be worth it?
Mill tried to handle problem one, which shows how to solve two as well. To stop and calculate the problem of every task would be impossible. We need not do this for all people in general, nor only those involved. Rather, it is enough to apply rules which have come about form experience as what act should be chosen for the greater consequences.
Rules of morality are generalizable, but also improvable (“subordinate principles”, or secondary rules, are enough; we need not always appeal to the principle of utility, and our subordinate principles can and should be revised wherever possible).
The sub. prin. of keeping promises has proven over time to contribute to the overall maximization of happiness than breaking promises, thus we ought to keep promises, even if in a particular case the consequence will not work out beneficially. The general rule will bring about the greatest good for the greatest number on the whole over time.
All things being equal, however, no decision could be made as to which is better, breaking or keeping a promise. The strict deontologist considers all consequences irrelevant; the moderate deontologist argues that it becomes difficult to determine how much value certain consequences have. In all, though, what is the justification of holding to subordinate principles in a given situation if the consequences of such an action will be worse than not holding to the principle? This solution only makes sense if the consequences of such a decision are not known.
Act and Rule Utilitarianism (AU and RU): The use of rules is a concession to these objections, without giving up util. RU states that even if the consequences are greater in a particular situation, following the rule will have the greatest utility yield in the long run.
AU: An act is right if and only if it produces the most good
RU: An act is right if it accords with a rule that generally produces greater good consequences.
Actual Rule Utilitarianism (ARU) and Ideal Rule Utilitarianism(IRU)
Are the rules actual or ideal? The actual rules of society, or the ideal rules that would be greater if followed? Mill, Moore, and S. Toulmin—Actual Rules.
ARU and IRU can produce conflicting results, but both tend to appear less than consequentialist. With ARU, it is no longer the consequence of a particular situation that matter, but the consequences following the general rule.
Why sacrifice the good in particular situations? And how else would a rule improve if we did not take into consideration the consequences of particular situations. (Whether we known the result before hand is crucial. If we do, then the argument stands; if we do not, then we have an answer to the question.) ARU has the danger of defining what is right by virtue of the rule and not the consequence.
IRU has the same problem even more. Acting on Ideal rules means ignoring consequences for the sake of the rule, which is no longer consequentialist.
Richard Brandt argues that to adopt IRU and maintain its consequentialism is to act on AU. There is then no difference between the two.
AU, like egoism (EE), faces the challenge of the claims of competing groups. If AU is for all people then, AU creates an impossible conflict to resolve. IRU does not have this problem, since all people would in the long run be better off by following the ideal rule.
G.E. Moore’s Criticism:
In order to know if an act is right, we need to know all the consequences of an act, and every other possible (relevant) acts. It is obvious that many seemingly inconsequential things may change the world in many ways. If this is true we can never know what all the consequences are in an indefinite series of events that could affect thousands of people. Therefore, we cannot know the right or wrong of a particular act.
Mediated and Unmediated consequences: Should we count mediated consequences when making moral assessment? What if your contribution was virtually meaningless and unknowing? E.x., simply giving someone directions, is it relevant if they are going to rob a bank?
“Ripple in the Pond” postulate: that our effect on consequences gradually reduces to zero. There seems no non-self-serving reason to accept this.
What counts as a consequence? Throwing a stone through a window and the hidden Jew example: The two consequences are different, but how? In the latter, other actors are involved that can affect the outcome. How could you know all the outcomes? And whose act is the act a consequence of?
An obvious problem is that mediated consequences, if relevant, leave open the possibility that we become responsible for things outside of our control. For example, gay couple holding hands leads to their being attacked. Are they responsible? Absurd to thing it the couple’s fault. It makes a cause out of something that is not. Do we really bare the responsibility of someone else’s moral failure for such simple facts?
Counting mediated consequences makes it so that any one can make any of our actions bad simply by acting consequently badly on account of them. Which consequences become relevant for moral consideration is an important moral choice. How, and on what basis can it be decided?
Friday, January 08, 2010
Syllabus and Reading List for "Ethics: Justice and Public Morality
Syllabus:
Ethics: Justice and Public Morality
Spring 2010 Instructor: Jason M. Nicholson
Office Periods: 1, 2, 5, 8
Email: jnicholson@wayland.org
Office Phone: 920-885-3373 x290
Course Description
This course will focus upon the major traditions in ethics, including Virtue Theory, Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Natural Law Theory. It will also look at the major traditions of contemporary political philosophy, including Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Critical Theory. The purpose of the course is to guide the student through the major traditions of ethics and political philosophy in order to come to a better understanding of the value, the problems, and the role of ethics in the public square. The course will have three components: first, primary readings from the major philosophical traditions; second, applications of the major philosophical traditions to the current public debate on major moral issues, such as euthanasia, affirmative action, pollution, gay rights, stem-cell research, abortion, presidential lying, animal rights, the moral limits of markets, individual rights and the claims of community, among others; third, a seminar style forum for open dialogue and honest debate.
Class Methodology
The course will be run as a mix of seminar, lecture, and debate. Students, therefore, are expected to be familiar with the readings and to be ready to discuss them at the start of class. Formal lectures will be frequent, but kept to a minimum, and we will focus instead upon digging deeper into critical portions of each text and issue. All along, we will attempt to tie together the various themes that emerge from each reading, and relate them to the motivating questions of the course as a whole. Readings will be assigned on a weekly basis, so that we will typically spend each day of a given week discussing the same readings. The readings associated with each week in the syllabus will be ‘due’ at the beginning of the first class for that week. On Mondays, each student will bring to class a question, comment, or concern about that week’s reading(s), which will be read aloud at the beginning of class and used to generate and direct discussion. Wednesdays will be reserved for a selection of video lectures that we will watch form Harvard professor Michael J. Sandel.
Required Texts
Michael J. Sandel, Justice: A Reader
Course Requirements
Class presentations: 20%
Written Perspective Papers: 50%
Written Exams: 30%
Reading List:
Justice and Public Morality: Reading List 2010
(In tandem with Michael Sandel's Harvard Justice Course)
I. Introduction
Lecture 1: Doing the right thing (Reader, pp. 3-7)
Lecture 2: Matters of life and death (Reader, pp. 9-7)
The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) (The lifeboat case)
II. Utilitarianism
Lecture 3: The greatest good for the greatest number (Reader, pp. 9-14)
Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. I, IV
Lecture 4: Higher and lower pleasures (Reader, pp. 14-47)
J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism
III. Libertarianism
Lecture 5: Liberty and the minimal state (Reader, pp. 49-73)
Friedman, Free to Choose, ch. 5
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, excerpts
Lecture 6: Liberty and self-ownership (Reader, pp. 73-82)
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, ch. 6
IV. Locke: Property Rights
Lecture 7: John Locke: The right to property (Reader, pp. 84-97)
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 1-5
Lecture 8: John Locke: Government by consent (Reader, pp. 97-126)
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 7-11, 18-19
V. Markets and Morals:
Lecture 9: Markets and Morals: Military service (Reader, pp. 127-138)
Calabresi and Bobbit, Tragic Choices, pp. 158-65
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 600-11
Traub, “All Go Down Together”
Lecture 10: Markets and Morals: Surrogate motherhood (Reader, pp. 138-156)
In the Matter of Baby ‘M’ (1987)
In the Matter of Baby ‘M’ (1988, N.J. Supreme Court)
Anderson, "Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?"
VI. Kant: Freedom as Autonomy
Lecture11: Immanuel Kant: Morality and freedom (Reader, pp. 158-199)
Begin Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals
Lecture 12: Immanuel Kant: The supreme principle of morality (same as above)
Finish Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals
Lecture 13: Immanuel Kant: Is lying always wrong (Reader, pp.199-201)
Kant, “On the Supposed Right to Lie”
VII. Rawls: Justice as Fairness
Lecture 14: The morality of consent (Reader, pp. 203-221)
Rawls, A Theory of Justice
ch. I (sec. 1-6)
ch. II (sec. 11-14, 17)
ch. III (sec. 20, 24)
ch. IV (sec. 40)
VIII. Distributive Justice: Equality, Entitlement, Merit
Lecture 15: Equality and Inequality (Reader, pp. 223-226)
Rawls, A Theory of Justice
ch. V (sec. 41, 48)
ch. VII (sec. 68)
ch. IX (sec. 79, 84, 87)
Lecture 16: Equality, effort, and merit (Reader, pp. 226-235)
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, excerpt
IX. Affirmative Action: Reverse Discrimination?
Lecture 17: Arguing affirmative action (Reader, pp.237-262)
Bernstein, "Racial Discrimination or Righting Past Wrongs?"
Hopwood v. State of Texas (1996)
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
Dworkin, "Bakke’s Case: Are Quotas Unfair?"
Morley, "Double Reverse Discrimination"
Brus, "Proxy War: Liberals Denounce Racial Profiling. Conservatives
Denounce Affirmative Action. What’s the Difference?"
X. Aristotle I
Lecture 18:Aristotle: Giving people their due (Reader, pp. 264-299)
Aristotle, The Politics, Bks. I, III (ch. 1-13)
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bks II (ch. 1-3), X (ch. 1-3)
XI. Ability, Disability, and Discrimination:
Lecture 19: Ability, Disability, and Justice (Reader, pp. 301-313)
Presley, "A Safety Blitz; Texas Cheerleader Loses Status"
Sandel “Honor and Resentment”
Ryan, "Sorry, Free Rides Not Right"
Kite, "Keep the PGA on Foot"
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (2000)
XII. Aristotle II
Lecture 20: Aristotle Politics, Justice and Virtue (Reader, pp. 264-299)
Review: Aristotle, The Politics, Bks. I, III (ch. 1-13)
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bks II (ch. 1-3), X (ch. 1-3)
XIII. Justice, Community, and Membership
Lecture 21: The claims of community (Reader, pp. 315-334)
MacIntyre, After Virtue, ch. 15
Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, pp. 7-17
Lecture 22: Is loyalty a virtue? (Reader, pp. 335-342)
Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 6-10, 86-91, 312-314
XIV. Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Lecture 23: Morality and Law: Debating same-sex marriage (Reader, pp. 343-384)
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 3-15, 29-35, 144-58
Sandel, "Political Liberalism"
Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health (2003)
Lecture 24: Justice, Morality, and Law (Reader, pp. 383-410)
Kinsley, "Abolish Marriage"
Finnis, "Law, Morality, and ‘Sexual Orientation’"
Macedo, "Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind"
West, "Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage"
Ethics: Justice and Public Morality
Spring 2010 Instructor: Jason M. Nicholson
Office Periods: 1, 2, 5, 8
Email: jnicholson@wayland.org
Office Phone: 920-885-3373 x290
Course Description
This course will focus upon the major traditions in ethics, including Virtue Theory, Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Natural Law Theory. It will also look at the major traditions of contemporary political philosophy, including Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Critical Theory. The purpose of the course is to guide the student through the major traditions of ethics and political philosophy in order to come to a better understanding of the value, the problems, and the role of ethics in the public square. The course will have three components: first, primary readings from the major philosophical traditions; second, applications of the major philosophical traditions to the current public debate on major moral issues, such as euthanasia, affirmative action, pollution, gay rights, stem-cell research, abortion, presidential lying, animal rights, the moral limits of markets, individual rights and the claims of community, among others; third, a seminar style forum for open dialogue and honest debate.
Class Methodology
The course will be run as a mix of seminar, lecture, and debate. Students, therefore, are expected to be familiar with the readings and to be ready to discuss them at the start of class. Formal lectures will be frequent, but kept to a minimum, and we will focus instead upon digging deeper into critical portions of each text and issue. All along, we will attempt to tie together the various themes that emerge from each reading, and relate them to the motivating questions of the course as a whole. Readings will be assigned on a weekly basis, so that we will typically spend each day of a given week discussing the same readings. The readings associated with each week in the syllabus will be ‘due’ at the beginning of the first class for that week. On Mondays, each student will bring to class a question, comment, or concern about that week’s reading(s), which will be read aloud at the beginning of class and used to generate and direct discussion. Wednesdays will be reserved for a selection of video lectures that we will watch form Harvard professor Michael J. Sandel.
Required Texts
Michael J. Sandel, Justice: A Reader
Course Requirements
Class presentations: 20%
Written Perspective Papers: 50%
Written Exams: 30%
Reading List:
Justice and Public Morality: Reading List 2010
(In tandem with Michael Sandel's Harvard Justice Course)
I. Introduction
Lecture 1: Doing the right thing (Reader, pp. 3-7)
Lecture 2: Matters of life and death (Reader, pp. 9-7)
The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) (The lifeboat case)
II. Utilitarianism
Lecture 3: The greatest good for the greatest number (Reader, pp. 9-14)
Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. I, IV
Lecture 4: Higher and lower pleasures (Reader, pp. 14-47)
J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism
III. Libertarianism
Lecture 5: Liberty and the minimal state (Reader, pp. 49-73)
Friedman, Free to Choose, ch. 5
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, excerpts
Lecture 6: Liberty and self-ownership (Reader, pp. 73-82)
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, ch. 6
IV. Locke: Property Rights
Lecture 7: John Locke: The right to property (Reader, pp. 84-97)
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 1-5
Lecture 8: John Locke: Government by consent (Reader, pp. 97-126)
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 7-11, 18-19
V. Markets and Morals:
Lecture 9: Markets and Morals: Military service (Reader, pp. 127-138)
Calabresi and Bobbit, Tragic Choices, pp. 158-65
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 600-11
Traub, “All Go Down Together”
Lecture 10: Markets and Morals: Surrogate motherhood (Reader, pp. 138-156)
In the Matter of Baby ‘M’ (1987)
In the Matter of Baby ‘M’ (1988, N.J. Supreme Court)
Anderson, "Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?"
VI. Kant: Freedom as Autonomy
Lecture11: Immanuel Kant: Morality and freedom (Reader, pp. 158-199)
Begin Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals
Lecture 12: Immanuel Kant: The supreme principle of morality (same as above)
Finish Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals
Lecture 13: Immanuel Kant: Is lying always wrong (Reader, pp.199-201)
Kant, “On the Supposed Right to Lie”
VII. Rawls: Justice as Fairness
Lecture 14: The morality of consent (Reader, pp. 203-221)
Rawls, A Theory of Justice
ch. I (sec. 1-6)
ch. II (sec. 11-14, 17)
ch. III (sec. 20, 24)
ch. IV (sec. 40)
VIII. Distributive Justice: Equality, Entitlement, Merit
Lecture 15: Equality and Inequality (Reader, pp. 223-226)
Rawls, A Theory of Justice
ch. V (sec. 41, 48)
ch. VII (sec. 68)
ch. IX (sec. 79, 84, 87)
Lecture 16: Equality, effort, and merit (Reader, pp. 226-235)
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, excerpt
IX. Affirmative Action: Reverse Discrimination?
Lecture 17: Arguing affirmative action (Reader, pp.237-262)
Bernstein, "Racial Discrimination or Righting Past Wrongs?"
Hopwood v. State of Texas (1996)
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
Dworkin, "Bakke’s Case: Are Quotas Unfair?"
Morley, "Double Reverse Discrimination"
Brus, "Proxy War: Liberals Denounce Racial Profiling. Conservatives
Denounce Affirmative Action. What’s the Difference?"
X. Aristotle I
Lecture 18:Aristotle: Giving people their due (Reader, pp. 264-299)
Aristotle, The Politics, Bks. I, III (ch. 1-13)
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bks II (ch. 1-3), X (ch. 1-3)
XI. Ability, Disability, and Discrimination:
Lecture 19: Ability, Disability, and Justice (Reader, pp. 301-313)
Presley, "A Safety Blitz; Texas Cheerleader Loses Status"
Sandel “Honor and Resentment”
Ryan, "Sorry, Free Rides Not Right"
Kite, "Keep the PGA on Foot"
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (2000)
XII. Aristotle II
Lecture 20: Aristotle Politics, Justice and Virtue (Reader, pp. 264-299)
Review: Aristotle, The Politics, Bks. I, III (ch. 1-13)
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bks II (ch. 1-3), X (ch. 1-3)
XIII. Justice, Community, and Membership
Lecture 21: The claims of community (Reader, pp. 315-334)
MacIntyre, After Virtue, ch. 15
Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, pp. 7-17
Lecture 22: Is loyalty a virtue? (Reader, pp. 335-342)
Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 6-10, 86-91, 312-314
XIV. Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Lecture 23: Morality and Law: Debating same-sex marriage (Reader, pp. 343-384)
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 3-15, 29-35, 144-58
Sandel, "Political Liberalism"
Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health (2003)
Lecture 24: Justice, Morality, and Law (Reader, pp. 383-410)
Kinsley, "Abolish Marriage"
Finnis, "Law, Morality, and ‘Sexual Orientation’"
Macedo, "Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind"
West, "Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage"
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