Dear all,
Model UN season is now over. Please keep up with your assignments, and expect the coming weeks prior to Spring Break to move rapidly. If you need ANY help, please contact me.
Best,
JMN
Showing posts with label Tradition of Philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tradition of Philosophy. Show all posts
Sunday, February 07, 2010
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Notes on Utilitarianism
Hi, all. Many of you will be out for the next couple of days, so I am posting my entire set of notes on Utilitarianism for you. Please see me if you have any questions and especially if you get lost or confused.
Utilitarianism:
The value of consequences determines moral rightness. But consequences for whom? Maximize goodness for all people.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value: the possession of properties intrinsic to a thing or properties by virtue of a thing’s relation to other things. A thing’s value is based on either its intrinsic or extrinsic properties. Pleasure has intrinsic value. Epicureanism (hedonism) says yes. Pleasure is the highest good of happiness. But what of virtue (Stoics) a good will (Kant) or knowledge (Ross)?
“Ideal” Utilitarianism recognizes a plurality of things that are intrinsically good, such as virtue and knowledge.
Problems for Utilitarianism:
1) How can we predict the actual as opposed to intended consequences of our actions for all people who might be affected by them and for all acts available to us in a given situation, since the actual consequences are what determines rightness?
2) What about cases where the consequences seem irrelevant, such as truth telling and keeping promises? Truth telling and promise keeping are distinct from their consequences. If they are morally relevant, then utilitarianism has not taken morally relevant factors into consideration.
3) What about rights and justice? What happens when fundamental rights conflict with duty? If there are human rights, then having them doesn’t depend on the consequences of honoring them. Otherwise, not doing so can be justified if a greater good would come about by violating some or all of those rights in a given situation. Also, sometimes the greater good results from acting unjustly or unfairly. Is utilitarianism committed to saying that injustice would be worth it?
Mill tried to handle problem one, which shows how to solve two as well. To stop and calculate the problem of every task would be impossible. We need not do this for all people in general, nor only those involved. Rather, it is enough to apply rules which have come about form experience as what act should be chosen for the greater consequences.
Rules of morality are generalizable, but also improvable (“subordinate principles”, or secondary rules, are enough; we need not always appeal to the principle of utility, and our subordinate principles can and should be revised wherever possible).
The sub. prin. of keeping promises has proven over time to contribute to the overall maximization of happiness than breaking promises, thus we ought to keep promises, even if in a particular case the consequence will not work out beneficially. The general rule will bring about the greatest good for the greatest number on the whole over time.
All things being equal, however, no decision could be made as to which is better, breaking or keeping a promise. The strict deontologist considers all consequences irrelevant; the moderate deontologist argues that it becomes difficult to determine how much value certain consequences have. In all, though, what is the justification of holding to subordinate principles in a given situation if the consequences of such an action will be worse than not holding to the principle? This solution only makes sense if the consequences of such a decision are not known.
Act and Rule Utilitarianism (AU and RU): The use of rules is a concession to these objections, without giving up util. RU states that even if the consequences are greater in a particular situation, following the rule will have the greatest utility yield in the long run.
AU: An act is right if and only if it produces the most good
RU: An act is right if it accords with a rule that generally produces greater good consequences.
Actual Rule Utilitarianism (ARU) and Ideal Rule Utilitarianism(IRU)
Are the rules actual or ideal? The actual rules of society, or the ideal rules that would be greater if followed? Mill, Moore, and S. Toulmin—Actual Rules.
ARU and IRU can produce conflicting results, but both tend to appear less than consequentialist. With ARU, it is no longer the consequence of a particular situation that matter, but the consequences following the general rule.
Why sacrifice the good in particular situations? And how else would a rule improve if we did not take into consideration the consequences of particular situations. (Whether we known the result before hand is crucial. If we do, then the argument stands; if we do not, then we have an answer to the question.) ARU has the danger of defining what is right by virtue of the rule and not the consequence.
IRU has the same problem even more. Acting on Ideal rules means ignoring consequences for the sake of the rule, which is no longer consequentialist.
Richard Brandt argues that to adopt IRU and maintain its consequentialism is to act on AU. There is then no difference between the two.
AU, like egoism (EE), faces the challenge of the claims of competing groups. If AU is for all people then, AU creates an impossible conflict to resolve. IRU does not have this problem, since all people would in the long run be better off by following the ideal rule.
G.E. Moore’s Criticism:
In order to know if an act is right, we need to know all the consequences of an act, and every other possible (relevant) acts. It is obvious that many seemingly inconsequential things may change the world in many ways. If this is true we can never know what all the consequences are in an indefinite series of events that could affect thousands of people. Therefore, we cannot know the right or wrong of a particular act.
Mediated and Unmediated consequences: Should we count mediated consequences when making moral assessment? What if your contribution was virtually meaningless and unknowing? E.x., simply giving someone directions, is it relevant if they are going to rob a bank?
“Ripple in the Pond” postulate: that our effect on consequences gradually reduces to zero. There seems no non-self-serving reason to accept this.
What counts as a consequence? Throwing a stone through a window and the hidden Jew example: The two consequences are different, but how? In the latter, other actors are involved that can affect the outcome. How could you know all the outcomes? And whose act is the act a consequence of?
An obvious problem is that mediated consequences, if relevant, leave open the possibility that we become responsible for things outside of our control. For example, gay couple holding hands leads to their being attacked. Are they responsible? Absurd to thing it the couple’s fault. It makes a cause out of something that is not. Do we really bare the responsibility of someone else’s moral failure for such simple facts?
Counting mediated consequences makes it so that any one can make any of our actions bad simply by acting consequently badly on account of them. Which consequences become relevant for moral consideration is an important moral choice. How, and on what basis can it be decided?
Utilitarianism:
The value of consequences determines moral rightness. But consequences for whom? Maximize goodness for all people.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value: the possession of properties intrinsic to a thing or properties by virtue of a thing’s relation to other things. A thing’s value is based on either its intrinsic or extrinsic properties. Pleasure has intrinsic value. Epicureanism (hedonism) says yes. Pleasure is the highest good of happiness. But what of virtue (Stoics) a good will (Kant) or knowledge (Ross)?
“Ideal” Utilitarianism recognizes a plurality of things that are intrinsically good, such as virtue and knowledge.
Problems for Utilitarianism:
1) How can we predict the actual as opposed to intended consequences of our actions for all people who might be affected by them and for all acts available to us in a given situation, since the actual consequences are what determines rightness?
2) What about cases where the consequences seem irrelevant, such as truth telling and keeping promises? Truth telling and promise keeping are distinct from their consequences. If they are morally relevant, then utilitarianism has not taken morally relevant factors into consideration.
3) What about rights and justice? What happens when fundamental rights conflict with duty? If there are human rights, then having them doesn’t depend on the consequences of honoring them. Otherwise, not doing so can be justified if a greater good would come about by violating some or all of those rights in a given situation. Also, sometimes the greater good results from acting unjustly or unfairly. Is utilitarianism committed to saying that injustice would be worth it?
Mill tried to handle problem one, which shows how to solve two as well. To stop and calculate the problem of every task would be impossible. We need not do this for all people in general, nor only those involved. Rather, it is enough to apply rules which have come about form experience as what act should be chosen for the greater consequences.
Rules of morality are generalizable, but also improvable (“subordinate principles”, or secondary rules, are enough; we need not always appeal to the principle of utility, and our subordinate principles can and should be revised wherever possible).
The sub. prin. of keeping promises has proven over time to contribute to the overall maximization of happiness than breaking promises, thus we ought to keep promises, even if in a particular case the consequence will not work out beneficially. The general rule will bring about the greatest good for the greatest number on the whole over time.
All things being equal, however, no decision could be made as to which is better, breaking or keeping a promise. The strict deontologist considers all consequences irrelevant; the moderate deontologist argues that it becomes difficult to determine how much value certain consequences have. In all, though, what is the justification of holding to subordinate principles in a given situation if the consequences of such an action will be worse than not holding to the principle? This solution only makes sense if the consequences of such a decision are not known.
Act and Rule Utilitarianism (AU and RU): The use of rules is a concession to these objections, without giving up util. RU states that even if the consequences are greater in a particular situation, following the rule will have the greatest utility yield in the long run.
AU: An act is right if and only if it produces the most good
RU: An act is right if it accords with a rule that generally produces greater good consequences.
Actual Rule Utilitarianism (ARU) and Ideal Rule Utilitarianism(IRU)
Are the rules actual or ideal? The actual rules of society, or the ideal rules that would be greater if followed? Mill, Moore, and S. Toulmin—Actual Rules.
ARU and IRU can produce conflicting results, but both tend to appear less than consequentialist. With ARU, it is no longer the consequence of a particular situation that matter, but the consequences following the general rule.
Why sacrifice the good in particular situations? And how else would a rule improve if we did not take into consideration the consequences of particular situations. (Whether we known the result before hand is crucial. If we do, then the argument stands; if we do not, then we have an answer to the question.) ARU has the danger of defining what is right by virtue of the rule and not the consequence.
IRU has the same problem even more. Acting on Ideal rules means ignoring consequences for the sake of the rule, which is no longer consequentialist.
Richard Brandt argues that to adopt IRU and maintain its consequentialism is to act on AU. There is then no difference between the two.
AU, like egoism (EE), faces the challenge of the claims of competing groups. If AU is for all people then, AU creates an impossible conflict to resolve. IRU does not have this problem, since all people would in the long run be better off by following the ideal rule.
G.E. Moore’s Criticism:
In order to know if an act is right, we need to know all the consequences of an act, and every other possible (relevant) acts. It is obvious that many seemingly inconsequential things may change the world in many ways. If this is true we can never know what all the consequences are in an indefinite series of events that could affect thousands of people. Therefore, we cannot know the right or wrong of a particular act.
Mediated and Unmediated consequences: Should we count mediated consequences when making moral assessment? What if your contribution was virtually meaningless and unknowing? E.x., simply giving someone directions, is it relevant if they are going to rob a bank?
“Ripple in the Pond” postulate: that our effect on consequences gradually reduces to zero. There seems no non-self-serving reason to accept this.
What counts as a consequence? Throwing a stone through a window and the hidden Jew example: The two consequences are different, but how? In the latter, other actors are involved that can affect the outcome. How could you know all the outcomes? And whose act is the act a consequence of?
An obvious problem is that mediated consequences, if relevant, leave open the possibility that we become responsible for things outside of our control. For example, gay couple holding hands leads to their being attacked. Are they responsible? Absurd to thing it the couple’s fault. It makes a cause out of something that is not. Do we really bare the responsibility of someone else’s moral failure for such simple facts?
Counting mediated consequences makes it so that any one can make any of our actions bad simply by acting consequently badly on account of them. Which consequences become relevant for moral consideration is an important moral choice. How, and on what basis can it be decided?
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
Plato's Euthyphro and the Philosophical definition
While the literary problem of Plato's *Euthyphro* addresses the question "what is piety?", the philosophical question of the dialogue is how we can attain to an adequate definition of anything so as to ascertain the right action in any given circumstance? The dialogue presents six definitions of the "holy" (piety), through which we discover the three main features of a philosophical definition:
1) That the definition should make clear to what things it is prescribed;
2) That the definition should not include its opposite;
3) That the definition correspond to a singular reality (form) that is distinct (intelligible and communicable) from other things.
1) That the definition should make clear to what things it is prescribed;
2) That the definition should not include its opposite;
3) That the definition correspond to a singular reality (form) that is distinct (intelligible and communicable) from other things.
Tuesday, September 08, 2009
The Force and Failure of Parmenides' Argument
As we said yesterday, the central Thesis (CT) of Parmenides' argument is that "that which does not exist cannot be thought or spoken about." The argument depended on two premises:
1) A thing can be thought about only if it is possible for it to exist.
2) Anything that does not exist, cannot exist.
The contraposition of (2), led to (3) [see yesterday's post for premises 3-5]; then the hypothetical syllogism of (1) and (3) led to (4). Finally the contraposition of (4) led to (5, which is the central thesis.
The result of our analysis was that given the truth of (1) and (2), the argument did follow through to the central thesis. The question, then, is whether (1) and/or (2) is true or false. We examined (1) and found that to be most likely true. (2) however was not so lucky. There seems to have been an equivocation (change of meaning) on Parmenides' part regarding existence. It is not clear whether he meant a possible type of existence or an actual type of existence. (Clearly he would have not thought in these terms, but we can worry about his argument in this way.) If in (3) he means something like "possible existence", then the proposition becomes redundant, since the latter part of the proposition is already about possible existence. So it must be that he meant something like "Anything that does not actually exist, cannot exist." This, proposition, however, seems false, since it is true that my third child does not exist, but it is not true that it cannot exist. The counterexample shows that premise (2) is most likely false, and that the argument of Parmenides for the central thesis fails.
Since the argument that we considered depended on the correct definition of "existence", it is essential that we begin our philosophy with philosophical definitions, much like the ones that Socrates asks for in Plato's dialogues. We thus now move on to the Euthyphro
1) A thing can be thought about only if it is possible for it to exist.
2) Anything that does not exist, cannot exist.
The contraposition of (2), led to (3) [see yesterday's post for premises 3-5]; then the hypothetical syllogism of (1) and (3) led to (4). Finally the contraposition of (4) led to (5, which is the central thesis.
The result of our analysis was that given the truth of (1) and (2), the argument did follow through to the central thesis. The question, then, is whether (1) and/or (2) is true or false. We examined (1) and found that to be most likely true. (2) however was not so lucky. There seems to have been an equivocation (change of meaning) on Parmenides' part regarding existence. It is not clear whether he meant a possible type of existence or an actual type of existence. (Clearly he would have not thought in these terms, but we can worry about his argument in this way.) If in (3) he means something like "possible existence", then the proposition becomes redundant, since the latter part of the proposition is already about possible existence. So it must be that he meant something like "Anything that does not actually exist, cannot exist." This, proposition, however, seems false, since it is true that my third child does not exist, but it is not true that it cannot exist. The counterexample shows that premise (2) is most likely false, and that the argument of Parmenides for the central thesis fails.
Since the argument that we considered depended on the correct definition of "existence", it is essential that we begin our philosophy with philosophical definitions, much like the ones that Socrates asks for in Plato's dialogues. We thus now move on to the Euthyphro
Monday, September 07, 2009
The Argument of Parmenides
Just for fun, see if you can recreate the way we wrote the argument out in class. (Much of the work comes from M. Cohen's work on the history of Ancient philosophy):
1) A thing can be thought about only if it is possible for it to exist.
2) Anything that does not exist, cannot exist.
But 2 is equivalent by contraposition to:
3) Anything that can exist, does exist.
From (1) and (3) it follows that:
4) A thing can be thought about only if it exists.
which is also equivalent by contraposition to:
5) Anything that does not exist, cannot be thought about.
1) A thing can be thought about only if it is possible for it to exist.
2) Anything that does not exist, cannot exist.
But 2 is equivalent by contraposition to:
3) Anything that can exist, does exist.
From (1) and (3) it follows that:
4) A thing can be thought about only if it exists.
which is also equivalent by contraposition to:
5) Anything that does not exist, cannot be thought about.
Friday, September 04, 2009
Identity and Parmenides
The ship of Theseus is a good example of the problem of identity. Plutarch wrote about Theseus' ship which would be repaired plank by plank while out at sea. Philosophers have thought about this problem in relation to the ship: at what point is the ship no longer the same ship? The Mereologicaly Theory of Identity (MTI) states that the identity of the ship is located in the identity of its parts, such that X = Y if and only if all the part of X are also the same parts in Y. The advantage of MTI is in that it is very easy to draw the line of identity. The problem, however, is that we no longer can call identical many things that we believe persist through chance, including ourselves. If we deny MTI, however, then we must determine where the line is during change that transforms one thing into another.
Parmenides was concerned about such problems. His criticism of Heraclitus, and the paradoxes that Heraclitus seemed to introduce, was that if we take our observations about the world seriously, then we cannot help getting into logical trouble. Parmenides, therefore, determined to solve the problem of the one and the many (being and becoming) by ignoring the sensible world and arguing purely from reason, a priori. His became a deductive argument that all things are one and that change is an illusion.
Parmenides was concerned about such problems. His criticism of Heraclitus, and the paradoxes that Heraclitus seemed to introduce, was that if we take our observations about the world seriously, then we cannot help getting into logical trouble. Parmenides, therefore, determined to solve the problem of the one and the many (being and becoming) by ignoring the sensible world and arguing purely from reason, a priori. His became a deductive argument that all things are one and that change is an illusion.
Wednesday, September 02, 2009
The Sophists, Socrates, and Heraclitus
The Sophists leaned heavily on a skepticism of the intellect, and thus they trained their students in the art of persuasion, rather than the art of discovery. The Sophists were also skeptical about morality. Socrates is most famous for challenging the Sophists about their skepticism. Socrates transformed our understanding of the oracle's decree "know thyself". For him, the decree meant the art of self discovery in relation to the truth, as opposed to the traditional meaning, that everyone should know who they are in relation to society.
Heraclitus: "Nature loves to hide herself". He taught that all things are made of strife, but that very few are interested in discovering the truth about reality. Heraclitus has three main doctrines, of which we covered part of the first: the doctrine of opposites, which states that nothing can be known or can exist independently of its relation to its opposite. Nature is like a bow, it functions according to the tension of its parts, just as a bow gets its strength when pulled back. And just as a bow cannot be understood with understanding the tension it produces, so too nature cannot be understood with understanding that reality is a conjunction of its opposites. Hot requires cold, love requires hate. "The way up and the way down are the same."
Heraclitus: "Nature loves to hide herself". He taught that all things are made of strife, but that very few are interested in discovering the truth about reality. Heraclitus has three main doctrines, of which we covered part of the first: the doctrine of opposites, which states that nothing can be known or can exist independently of its relation to its opposite. Nature is like a bow, it functions according to the tension of its parts, just as a bow gets its strength when pulled back. And just as a bow cannot be understood with understanding the tension it produces, so too nature cannot be understood with understanding that reality is a conjunction of its opposites. Hot requires cold, love requires hate. "The way up and the way down are the same."
Tuesday, September 01, 2009
Pre Socratic Philosophy Before Heraclitus and Parmenides
Thales wasn't the first philosopher. The first person to wonder was. Thales, however, was the first we have recorded of asking the question of origins without recourse to religion. His questions were essentially, what is the source of all things, and is the source one or many. Anaximander followed closely behind Thales with the first recorded philosophical debate. He argued that water, which Thales thought was, could not be the source of all things, because water is by nature differentiated. You can't get something from what is not there, and it doesn't appear that water can produce all things. Rather, Anaximander argued that "the unbounded" or "apeiron" was the source of all things, because only the unbounded could be undifferentiated enough to produce all things. What is interesting is that Anaximander resorted to arguing for something essentially unobservable. So we have our first real debate: can there exists non-observable entities? Can such an entity be the source of all things?
Friday, August 21, 2009
Syllabus for "The Tradition of Philosophy: Ancient to Medieval"
The Tradition of Philosophy: Ancient to Medieval
Syllabus
Mr. J. Nicholson
Office: ACAD 206
jnicholson@wayland.org
Syllabus
Mr. J. Nicholson
Office: ACAD 206
jnicholson@wayland.org
Overview
“The Tradition of Philosophy” is a set of two courses (“Ancient to Medieval” and “Modern to Contemporary”) that comprise two separate semesters. Each course can be taken individually, but the set of courses is designed to work together. “The Tradition of Philosophy” is more than just the history of philosophy; it is an intellectual recasting of intellectual philosophical traditions. By “tradition” is meant the acquisition of not only the content of the philosophical problems and ideas in the history of philosophy, but also the acquisition of the intellectual habit of thinking according to the context of each philosophical tradition.
The fall semester course is an introductory course in the tradition of ancient and medieval philosophy. It covers the major authors of the tradition, their questions and their answers. It is a text-based course, which means that the main emphasis of the course will be devoted to the primary literature each author. Students in the course are introduced to an analytical style of philosophical inquiry, one that approaches texts and arguments from within their own conceptual framework. It is not, however, a course in analytic philosophy. In order to achieve the goal of critical analysis, the primary texts of each author within each respective tradition are used. The goal of the course is to introduce the students to the tradition of ancient and medieval philosophy, its relevance and its essential role in philosophical inquiry.
The requirements of the course consist of two term examinations (30% of the final grade); weekly “written reviews” of the reading material (roughly three pages in length (30% of the final grade), wherein the student will work through one of five critical skills at a time: 1) accurately understanding and recreating a particular argument; 2) locating various theories of criticism of an argument through the use of secondary literature (e.g., JSTOR); 3) expansion of a particular argument into other philosophically interesting areas; 4) contraction of a particular argument down to its essential components; 5) expression of a particular argument into different levels of readership; and, finally, each student is required to choose a philosophical argument from ancient and medieval philosophy, research it, and write a final paper of about 8-12 pages in length. (40% of the final grade)
Required Texts
Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle, ed. by Reginald E. Allen. The Free Press, 1991.
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. By Hyman and Walsh. Hackett Publishing, 1973.
Recommended Texts
Kenny, Anthony, Ancient Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2006.
_____, Medieval Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2007.
On Reserve
On occasion there will be books, articles or reviews put on reserve for research assignments. They are to be used solely in the library. It is recommended, however, that each student makes his or her own copy of the texts for personal use, but this is not required. It is highly recommended that students utilize the JSTOR services for access to scholarly literature. The Internet (“googling”) is not a scholarly tool. Therefore, unless approved by the instructor, no Internet sources other than online articles from reputable journals, such as those found in JSTOR will be accepted.
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